Help Us Weigh the Trade-Offs

Reflecting back on a media frenzy that was followed by death threats against a high school student and his family, a lawyer columnist argues it was media opposition to the pro-life beliefs of the young white male student that caused the error.

While that same lawyer columnist points out the intense pressure to get a story out quickly (and could have said more about market pressure on mass media today), the conclusion focuses on an accusation of ideological bias.

Ideology and tribal thinking are no doubt factors. But I was struck by a difference between how lawyer columnists (versus, say, lawyer social scientists) construct arguments. When LCs examine historical context (in this case, the numerous instances where very similar mistakes in media stories have inflicted harm on liberals) it is to use it to win the one case they are litigating. When LSSs do the same, it is to use the larger historical context to shed light on how to most accurately make sense of the case currently being scrutinized.

In this case, the difference appears to matter. This LC concludes ideology explains the outcome. I suspect an LSS would conclude that ideology is a factor explaining less of the outcome than the pressures of 24/7 news cycles and more about the structure of the mass media today.

 In a second story today, another columnist argues that those connecting the downed passenger plane to the assassination of an Iranian general get it wrong. In this case, the problem is different version of failing to help us weigh complex trade-offs. Here the analyst argues that those pointing to this connection are wrong because it would make no sense for the Iranians to intentionally shoot down a plan with 82 of Iranians on board in order to seek vengeance against the US.

That makes sense. And it is irrelevant. The connection here to be debated is the degree to which the assassination created a context where Iranian missile defense forces were significantly more likely to make the mistake they made. And, further, if it created this context unnecessarily. The analyst admits that the assassination ‘unquestionably exacerbated tensions.’ But she concludes questions about a connection can be put aside on the basis of the fact that Iran would never intentionally shoot down this plane.

The analyst admits that the assassination is related to the downing of the airliner. She adds that criticism from two Republican Senators about the rationale for the assassination are merely a ‘distraction.’ If the key point here is that Iran would not shoot down a plane because it had their own passengers on it, than the rationale for the assassination is unrelated to her argument about nonsensical Iranian intentions.

In both cases, these commentaries fail to help us weigh the difficult trade-offs involved in better understanding the world we live in. Neither is an egregious error and both make arguments worth considering. Yet, both reflect how deeply saturated our political conversations are with tribal reasoning, and how other types of inappropriate reasoning emerge in service of tribalism. We see here a litigious approach to utilizing historical data and a straw man approach to evaluating the ways erratic and potentially irrational presidential behavior may create conditions within which tragic mistakes are far more likely.